This paper provides an overview of standards and standard-setting processes. It describes the economic effect of technology standards -de facto as well as de jure -and differentiates between the impact on competition and welfare that various levels of standards have. It argues that most of what is claimed for "open standards" in recent policy debates was already well encompassed by the term "standards"; a different term is needed only if it is defined clearly in order to provide a distinct economic effect. This paper argues that open standards, properly defined, can have the particular economic effect of allowing "natural" monopolies to form in a given technology, while ensuring full competition among suppliers of that technology. This is a distinct economic effect that deserves to be distinguished by the use of a separate term, hence "open" rather than "ordinary" standards -referred to as "semi-open" in this paper.
The paper explains why open standards must allow all possible competitors to operate on a basis of equal access to the ability to implement the standard, and why this means that the economic effect of open standards may require different conditions for different markets. In most software markets, where Free/Libre/Open Source Software (FLOSS) provides significant competition, open standards can only be those that allow equal access to FLOSS producers.
A case is made for public procurement to support open standards, and empirical evidence provided from an analysis of actual tenders as well as from the FLOSSPOLS survey of government authorities to demonstrate how procurement policies in practice come in the way of competitive markets for software products. Finally, some guidelines are provided for effective policy in relation to open standards and interoperability:
The self-enhancing feedback loop caused by network effects together with the barriers posed to alternative technologies results in the dominance of particular products in their application areas, as natural monopolies. Monopolies are not obviously good for consumers, but the presumption of natural monopolies in many areas has often been thought to provide a better value for overall welfare than, say, having various incompatible systems leading to a Balkanised network of groups of users unable to talk to each other. However, monopolies are in a position to capture (or internalise) the value of network externalities -although this value is by definition not an attribute of an individual user's product or service, a monopoly or dominant player is in a position to raise the price of an individual user's access beyond its inherent value, based on the external value of the network effect. An e-mail system that allowed you to communicate with millions of others may be priced higher than a more sophisticated system that was limited to only a few thousand others. Thus, while monopolies have long been tolerated in the telecoms sector, they are usually subject to regulation to limit their natural tendency to work against consumer welfare.
Another approach to network effects, however, is to try to abstract the network externalities from specific products. This is achieved by identifying the feature of the technology that provides the network effect, and ensuring that its use is not limited to a specific product or service. Rather, products and services from different producers are made interoperable by agreeing on standards for the basic technology components that provide the network externalities. This way, in theory at least, a natural monopoly arises in terms of the technology, but competition can thrive in terms of actual products and services that interoperate.
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The problem arises that the natural monopoly on the technology for interoperability may have rights associated with it, and these rights may be owned by one market player (or a consortium). Such rights may be exploited to generate monopoly rents, which may counteract the competition in interoperable products and services that are enabled through the use of the standard. E.g. if the holder of rights to the standard seeks monopoly rents from all use of the standard, it has an anti-competitive advantage over other users of the standard.
Alternatively, rights-holders can use their licensing policies to control the further development of the standard, and to influence the market of products and service around the standard. While such influence could be used to improve social welfare, it could also be used to anti-competitive ends, by selectively granting the rights to producers and service providers using the standard. Such selection need not be arbitrary, it can also be achieved through the setting of licensing conditions that favour or discriminate against specific groups of producers. If the holder of rights covering a standard is also a supplier of products and services based on the standard, it has strong incentives to set licensing conditions that disadvantage the strongest potential competing suppliers. Thus, the natural monopoly that the standard creates in terms of technology may come along with competition in the market for products and services, but this competition may be limited by the control by rights-holders of the access to the standard technology.
Standards can be de facto, where natural monopoly arises from market conditions that are initially competitive among different technologies, with agreement among producers on the standard technology arriving without a formal process. Usually, such a standard emerges through market dominance of the technology, often hand-in-hand with market domination of the technology vendor. Rents from such de facto standards are among the most attractive available to IT firms (Morris & Ferguson, 1993) .
Alternatively, standards can be de jure, where a natural monopoly on technology is agreed upon by a body that may be an association (perhaps, but not necessarily, with a public interest mandate) of some combination of technology users and suppliers. Bodies with some level of formal process for defining such standards include ITU, ETSI, IEEE, W3C, IETF. While owners of rights over de facto standards clearly have the interest and ability to exploit their monopoly over the standard technology to control or dominate the market in products and services based on the standard, it is quite possible for owners of rights over de jure standards to do this as well. As West writes, "attempts to create advantage and lock-in are far from limited to the sponsors of de facto standards. Sponsors of de jure and consortia standards also gain advantage from attracting adopters and creating lock-in, if such standards are encumbered by private patent claims, as are standards such as W-CDMA, MPEG-4 and DVD" (West 2004 ). Some standards bodies try to limit this control and rent-seeking behaviour by defining processes to allow input from a variety of players in the definition of the standard (which affects what technologies, and thus what rights holders, are involved in the chosen standard). Standards bodies also define policies on licensing rights covering the standard, with various degrees of limits placed on the rights holders' ability to control suppliers of products and services based on the standard. Common policies include the requirement that rights be licensed under RAND ("Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory") or royalty-free terms.
If technology licensing policies are adopted (whether by the fiat of standards bodies or voluntarily by the technology rights holders) allowing all potential suppliers of products and services based on the technology to use it, without providing a competitive advantage to the rights holders, the theoretical economic effect of interoperable standards may be achieved. Standards based on such licensing policies could be called "open standards", with natural monopolies in the technology itself but competition in the supply of products and services using the technology.
2.Economic effects of types of standards
Much discussion around standards relates to the institutional processes of standard selection, and this has influenced the terminology surrounding standards: de facto, de jure, "open standards". This paper focusses, however, on the economic effect of different frameworks for technologies, and suggests the use of terminology based on the economic effect rather than the institutional processes alone.
Based on the above discussion, one could define three broad classes of technology frameworks based on the three broad classes of economic effect that they achieve:
1. Proprietary technologies: a natural monopoly in a technology results in a natural monopoly in the market for services and products based on the technology. These often become de facto standards, in which case they are properly referred to as "proprietary standards".
This occurs when the rights to the technology are available only to the rights holders, and results in a dominant position for the owner of the technology. , then a unique economic effect is achieved of separating the natural monopoly of the technology itself from any possible monopoly among suppliers of the technology It should be clear from this list that simple economic criteria are being used here to discriminate between different technology market models -the relationship between the natural monopoly of the technology and the extent of competition possible among suppliers of products and services based on that technology. Such criteria are meaningful for policy making, if policy is set in order to achieve a given economic effect. Clearly, a policy debate needs to distinguish between terms (such as standard and open standard) on the basis of the differences in the effect of the concepts behind them, otherwise the terms are in themselves meaningless.
It should also be clear from the above definitions that there is a distinct difference in the economic effect between "proprietary technologies" (or "proprietary standards"), "standards" and "open standards", in a progression of increased market competition. For the sake of clarity, we will refer in this paper to "standards" that are not "open standards" according to the definition above as "semi-open standards". This is a progression of normative frameworks that overcome the natural monopolies in certain technologies arising from the network effects associated with them. To the extent that monopolies harm welfare, the ability to augment the natural monopolies in technologies with a competitive market in the supply of products and services based on these technologies is positive. Thus there is a basis for consumers in general and policy makers in particular to encourage these normative frameworks, and to attempt to drive suppliers and markets towards the "open standards" at the competitive end of this progression.
This list does not indicate the processes required in order to achieve its goals, or the specific licensing terms that may be required to differentiate between standards and open standards. Such details could differ between different technology domains and depend on the market conditions.
For instance, the effect of open standards may be achieved with licenses requiring significant licensing fees and restrictions on use in a market where only firms with deep pockets and strong legal support structures can implement the technology concerned -such as the market for GSM cellphones (see discussion in the next section). In such markets, where huge 2 It should be noted that rights over technology are not the only way vendors can gain a competitive advantage. Developing or first implementing the technology can also provide competitive advantages. Some consideration may therefore be given to the governance of the development and maintenance process. However, the economic effects of an open standard more likely to be influenced by the control of rights over the technology than clear governance mechanisms, e.g. of standards bodies. So with equal, sustained and guaranteed access to the rights for all potential players, even de facto standards that do not have very clear governance mechanisms could be open standards in terms of the economic effect they achieve.
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investments are required for product development, royalties may not pose additional entry barriers. Indeed, in such markets, licensing terms may be less important than the processes involved in determining a standard (i.e. choosing the monopoly technology), which is why discussion of open standards relating to hardware or telecommunications often focusses most on due process, participation in standards-setting and the publication of specifications rather than pure competition effects.
Similarly, in markets based on unit sales audit or "no-sublicensing" requirements may not pose additional entry barriers.
However, in a market where competing products and services could be implemented by small firms or groups of individuals without significant funds or the ability to control or audit the use of the licensed technology (such as Free/Libre/Open Source Software -FLOSSdevelopers publishing their work under reciprocal or "copyleft" licenses), the economic effect of open standards as described above may only be achieved by licensing terms that are free of royalty and licence-audit requirements 3 . Indeed, in some markets, not only are such producers potential providers of products, they are the main competitors to suppliers that hold a dominant position. In markets where FLOSS developers provide the significant existing or potential competition, royalty, audit or no-sublicensing conditions (among others) do pose barriers, and reduce competition greatly, preventing the "open standard" effect. Achieving under such market conditions the economic effect of full competition in the market for products and services based on open standards would thus require the rights to the standard being made available under terms compatible with the existing legal and technical methods of FLOSS development.
3.Open standards: different terms in different markets
The above discussion indicates that to maximize social welfare through the achievement of full competition in the market for products, the same rules can lead to different results, and different rules can lead to the same results, from sector to sector and technology to technology based on the market conditions unique to each. . EICTA and the Business Software Alliance, among others, use the example of GSM to argue in favour of standard adoption under licensing regimes that require royalty payments and other conditions. Indeed, such conditions have not necessarily reduced competition or overly advantaged some producers of GSM technologies over others. However, the requirements, in terms of financial, technical and legal infrastructure, to produce GSM equipment are quite demanding. Compared to, say, the capital requirements for manufacturing telecommunications hardware, the licensing and royalty conditions of the GSM standard itself are relatively undemanding. For the moment, at least, These arguments supporting royalty or other restrictive licensing conditions have no connection, however, with most parts of the market for software, and it is software and data interchange formats that are the main focus of the IDABC EIF 6 .
We discuss for illustration the domain of desktop office productivity software such as word processors, where the market conditions are completely different from that of mobile telephony equipment manufacturing. There is clear market domination by one proprietary product, Microsoft Word, and the sole supplier of this product, Microsoft.
The most significant competitor in terms of current and potential usage is OpenOffice Writer, an application developed by FLOSS developers and distributed under the GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL). Any technology that disadvantages OpenOffice developers clearly does not achieve the market effect of full competition. Any de facto or de jure standard that is not licensed under terms that are usable in the development of OpenOffice cannot achieve the market effect of full competition, as OpenOffice developers are among the most significant competitors to the dominant supplier (indeed, full competition would require allowing equal access to the technology not just to significant competitors but to all potential competitors).
OpenOffice is licensed under the GNU Lesser General Public License, the LGPL 7 , which has the following features (among others):
1. it requires that the software may be redistributed without charge or notice 2. it does not allow distribution of the software to be monitored or audited 3. it requires that derived works of the software may be built and redistributed without charge or notice to the original developer 4. it is an irrevocable license, as long as its terms are met are not irrevocable. In theory, Adobe could wait until naïve public bodies all use its format, then arbitrarily terminate the patent licences allowing PDF readers from competing vendors, then charge for its own PDF Reader software.
Going beyond word-processing
While this analysis has focussed on the specific example of word processing and text documents, it should be noted that the leading competitors to dominant market players in several parts of the software market are produced by FLOSS developers, and FLOSS software provides increasingly viable (and certainly future potential) competition. Second, for most software standards the formal specification is insufficient and the actual standard may differ from across implementations. Thus, some bodies (such as the IETF) require multiple interoperating implementations before recognising a standard. As West writes, "for complex digital systems standards, the formal specification is inherently incomplete and the actual standard is defined both through the written specification and through actual implementations... for any firm trying to implement a standard, knowledge of both the formal specification and existing implementations is valuable. Otherwise, the implementer faces an extended trial-and-error process as it seeks to discover how other firms have resolved specification ambiguities. So a typology of openness must consider the openness both of the specification and implementation."
This suggests the need for a reference implementation to augment -if not, perhaps, replacethe formal specification of the standard. When such a reference implementation is available under a FLOSS licence, it may achieve the economic effect of an open standard as defined above, even without the institutional processes of standard setting, since the reference implementation may act as the formal specification (especially if sufficiently well documented) and be reproduced without economic restrictions by any potential vendor of the technology 17 .
Thus, in this regard the IDABC EIF definition of open standards is in one sense too restrictive in requiring a formal institutional process of standards-setting. As shown in the previous section, formal institutional processes are neither sufficient, nor, as just discussed, even necessary to achieve the economic effects desired of open standards.
The above discussion shows that although open standards and FLOSS are certainly not equivalent, they are closely related in terms of the economic effect they achieve, and the way in which they do this. The next section examines how this relates to public procurement policy.
4.Standards, software and procurement
Beyond the general description of the economic effect of standards, there are several issues specifically related to the public procurement of software and the provision of eGovernment services (government services for citizens and businesses) in particular.
Private consumers and firms may have some interest in furthering market competition so as not to lock themselves into technologies associated with continuous rent-seeking from dominant players. This is rarely an obligation. Public sector consumers, however, have in 17 Reference implementations that are not distributed under a FLOSS licence clearly do not in themselves achieve the economic effect of open standards. Even with a FLOSS reference implementation, clear, documented specifications separate from the implementation are probably required to allow other implementations.
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many situations an obligation to support (and certainly not to harm) competition through their procurement practices, for a number of reasons: 1. they are obliged to avoid explicitly harming competition in the market of private consumers. Thus, public agencies should not require citizens to purchase systems from specific vendors in order to access public services, as this is equivalent to granting such vendors a state-sanctioned monopoly.
2. they are obliged to save costs -taxpayer money -over the very long term. This is equivalent to an obligation to further net welfare, which is harmed by rent-seeking behaviour and weakened competition.
The first point implies that eGovernment services should provide access based on open standards, as defined previously in this paper on the basis of their economic effect: fostering a fully competitive market. In particular, the public sector should never require citizens to purchase systems from specific vendors in order to access public services: this is equivalent to granting such vendors a state-sanctioned monopoly. It is absurd to pursue vendors for anticompetitive practices, while at the same time entrenching the dominant market positions of vendors by requiring that citizens buy their software in order to access public services, or requiring that businesses buy their software in order to compete for public tenders. Examples abound, from the Dutch Tax Authority requiring the use of Windows for filing electronic tax returns Empirical evidence from the FLOSSPOLS survey of 955 public authorities across 13 EU countries shows that public authorities are not generally aware of the economic effect of their own procurement choices. In particular, while expressing support in general terms for open standards and interoperability, they are unclear about what these terms mean (or should mean, for any meaningful economic effect). This is best illustrated through the response public authorities give when asked to rank the importance to a procurement decision for new software on compatibility with software that they are already using, in comparison to interoperability with competing software. . What applies to public procurement of hardware could reasonably be thought to apply to software procurement too, especially as the use of tenders with explicit requirements for compatibility with proprietary software standards appears to be quite common.
While this subject clearly needs empirical research beyond the scope of this paper, a quick keyword search for tenders on TED, the EU's public procurement portal 24 identified 149 recent tenders including the term "Microsoft". A brief analysis below, of six calls for tender, identifies the strong anti-competitive effects of public procurement that favours "compatibility" with proprietary standards over "interoperability" with open standards.
1. The anti-competitive effect starts with the procurement process itself, which may require bidders to purchase software from specific vendors. For instance, a tender from Scottish Enterprise, 2005, states that "All expressions of interest shall be provided either on paper 20
European Commission, 2004. 21 Specifically, "Intel or equivalent" was found to be "a violation of Directive 93/36/EEC on public supply contracts, and specifying clock rates was found "contrary to Article 28 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits any barriers to intra-Community trade". . While not as bad as requiring citizens to purchase software from a single vendor for access to essential government services, such procurement procedure requirements are clearly detrimental to competition in the market for software even among private consumers.
2. A typical case of explicit preference to bidders using technologies from favoured providers is a tender from Fife Council, 2005, which is for additional services to be built around "an interactive site provisioned through the use of Macromedia Cold Fusion and Microsoft SQL"
26
. Such anti-competitive preferences are quite common even when they are not explicitly stated -tenders for the provision of websites for the European Commission, for instance, may require compatibility with the europa.eu.int EU portal. As Europa is based on proprietary technologies (including ColdFusion), a specific vendor preference is introduced into the market even without mentioning brand names. This perfectly illustrates vendor lock-in, and how the anti-competitive effect goes beyond the public sector alone when public bodies are locked in. The original procurement of technology for Europa may have indeed been truly competitive in nature. Since it obviously did not require the use of open standards, all future procurement related to Europa is anti-competitive in nature and favours the single vendor owning rights to the original technology chosen, directly (through purchase of the same vendors' software) and indirectly (through the requirement that suppliers of additional websites compatible with Europa purchase these vendors' software).
3. An example of how past purchase of software based on proprietary technology ensures a preference for the same proprietary technology (and thus favouring its sole vendor directly, or bidders who are customers of that sole vendor) is in this tender from Eurojust, 2005, a European international organisation, for a library automation system 27 . In this tender, the preference for compatibility with previously purchased proprietary technology is explicitly stated: "Eurojust employs Intel-based servers running Windows 2003 and workstations running Windows XP . The network protocol in use is TCP/IP. Any proposed software must be able to function efficiently in this environment. Eurojust has a strong preference for Microsoft SQL as the database to minimise the variety of software to be supported inhouse. It must be possible to integrate the system with Microsoft's Active Directory for user information and access control." Clearly, Microsoft and its customers are favoured in this tender. If the previously purchased software was based on open standards, the new system could have been required to be interoperable with those open standards, thus giving no preference to individual vendors. , signed a contract with Microsoft Ireland for "software licences" worth Euro 2.69 million over three years. The justification provided for this negotiated procedure is a concise statement of the argument presented previously in this document: "The works/goods/services can be provided only by a particular tenderer for reasons that are: Connected with protection of exclusive rights." Clearly, if proprietary technology is specified as part of the requirements, as explained in section 2 above, only the rights holder can provide the technology, due to the "protection of exclusive rights" around the technology.
According to the European Commission, "Under European law on public procurement, a brand may be specified only if it is otherwise impossible to describe the product sufficiently precisely and intelligibly" (European Commission, 2004) . True, the only way to describe proprietary software products such as Microsoft Office or Macromedia ColdFusion is through their brand names. But specifying these products in public procurement, rather than productindependent technical requirements, is surely anti-competitive. Just as the EC argued that microprocessors can be selected on performance criteria rather than specific clock rates (which favour a single vendor), software and software services should be selected on the basis of technology rather than products.
In order to ensure that this is done continuously it is essential to avoid the progression described in the examples above, from one original purchase that was perhaps competitive, to implicitly or explicitly favouring the same vendor (or resellers) repeatedly in all further purchases. As the examples show, this leads eventually to favouring or even requiring private sector bidders to purchase software from the same preferred vendors, cementing their position in the market place beyond the public sector.
For the reasons presented previously in section 2, on the lock-in effect of proprietary standards, and section 4, on the effect of relationship between public procurement and standards in the software market, the only way such sustained competitive public procurement can be achieved is through:
1. defining procurement requirement by technology rather than individual (named) products 2. explicitly excluding compatibility with proprietary technologies as a selection criterion 3. requiring (or at least preferring) interoperability with open standards
6.Empirical evidence from the FLOSSPOLS survey
In addition to the widespread prevalence of compatibility as a selection criterion above interoperability, the FLOSSPOLS survey also provides an empirical association between open standards and FLOSS. Local governments that consciously using FLOSS are much stronger supporters of interoperability (67%) compared to only 50% of non-users. We see from the survey results that limitations to interoperability set by proprietary software vendors help to An Economic Basis for Open Standards flosspols.org increase a demand for FLOSS in an organisation. This is of course only when the IT department of that organisation truly wants interoperability, and is aware of the conflict between interoperability and proprietary software applications that promote lock-in ("compatibility") with their own proprietary standards. In contrast, organisations that do not prefer interoperability with open standards in their purchasing decisions are more likely to remain locked in to proprietary vendors providing compatibility with previously purchased software.
The association between open standards, inter-vendor interoperability, FLOSS usage and vendor lock-in is highlighted in two further findings from the FLOSSPOLS survey. First, FLOSS users -who, as we have seen, are likelier to favour open standards and interoperability -rely on more vendors on average than non-users (who, as we have seen, are likelier to favour compatibility with previously purchased software and thus get locked in to past vendors). 41% of FLOSS users have 1 to 4 regular vendors for their IT software and services; 59% have more than 4 vendors. For non-users of FLOSS this ratio is reversed -61% have 1 to 4 vendors and only 39% have more than 4 vendors. This indicates a higher degree of concentration and possibly lower competition among suppliers of non-users of FLOSS in comparison to organisations with some FLOSS use. While the survey did not show a clear causal relationship between FLOSS use and number of vendors (which could be influenced by external factors), increasing competition is frequently cited by IT managers as a reasons to use FLOSS 30 . Indeed, the survey showed a clear relationship between perceived over-dependence on vendors and a desire to increase FLOSS use. As shown in Figure 2 below, 53% of those who would like to increase their FLOSS use felt too dependent on vendors, compared to only 30% of those who do not want to increase FLOSS use. A closer look at current FLOSS non-users clarifies the link between FLOSS use and vendor independence. We defined two sub-groups of these non-users -those who would value increased FLOSS use, "future adopters", and those who would not, "persistent non-users". 58% of the "future adopters" say they are too dependent on vendors, while only 32% of the "persistent non-users" feel too dependent. Similarly, only 39% of "future adopters", compared to 64% of "persistent non-users" feel not too dependent on vendors. These differences indicate that for even for those who do not already use FLOSS (consciously), vendor dependency is indeed a strong driving force towards FLOSS use in the future. 
7.Policy strategies for public procurement
Section 4 describes possible policy goals for public procurement in order to support -or at least, not undermine -the economic effects that can be achieved by the use of open standards as defined in this paper. Section 5 shows that public authorities in practice fail to achieve these goals, as they support strongly anti-competitive behaviour through their procurement policies favouring compatibility with proprietary technologies. Section 6 suggests that some public authorities attempt to reach some of these goals -increased competition, reduced vendor lock-in -through the use of FLOSS.
Open standards are not the same as FLOSS, and public administrations generally support the principle of open standards even when they are reluctant to support any policy with regards to FLOSS. However, support for open standards is in practice not meaningful unless it is strong support -mandatory, where possible -and using a clear definition of open standards based on an understanding of their effects. Empirical evidence (e.g. Ghosh and Glott 2003) has shown that "most ICT managers do not know for sure which standards are open and which are closed", with surprisingly high shares of survey respondents presuming that standards they use (e.g. Microsoft Word DOC) must be open while others that they use rarely must be closed. As Section 5 shows, the result is that a general stated principle in favour of interoperability is often replaced in practice with policies that favour compatibility with the proprietary standards of previously purchased software. Not only does this result in vendor lock-in for buyers, it also reinforces the market position of dominant players, with broadly negative effects for competition. Moreover, public authorities that favour interoperability in practice seem to implicitly or explicitly encourage FLOSS use.
A recommendation for public policy for effective support for interoperability, therefore, must start with a mandatory requirement not to include compatibility with previously purchased , although the criteria used by them differ from ours, which are based on the economic effect of the standard.
For several software domains, FLOSS developers provide viable competitive products and therefore the definition of "open standards" must be compatible with FLOSS development and licensing models. As described in section 3, this typically means that licences on rights over the standard must be made available to FLOSS developers on a royalty-free, audit-free, sublicensable and irrevocable basis. Some commentators have pointed out that according to European law "only specifications that are issued by public standardisation bodies are considered standards" 34 and only such standards can be specified in calls for tender. This is a result of European Directive 98/34/EC (EU 1998), which listing national standards bodies as well as recognised European standards bodies 35 . The Directive is designed to "create an environment that is conducive to the competitiveness of undertakings"
36
. In practice, as in the example calls for tender in section 5, procurement processes are often anti-competitive. The present argument has shown that the legalistic definition of standards used by the Directive (as approved by recognised public standards bodies, with no concern for their licensing methods) is no guarantor of competition in public procurement or in the economy at large. 
